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Summary of findings
The transition to a market driven development strategy in Latin America for over more than a decade has
redefined business strategies and reshaped the state=s traditional role of guarantor of employment stability and
protection.  These changes, plus the move to create more flexible labor markets in some countries, have lead to the
elimination or reduction of legislated employment protections and benefits, creating space for a Anew unionism@ in
which unions may enlarge their role in collective bargaining.  As a result, unions are redirecting their traditional
strategy of extracting benefits for their members through political ties to the state to one that realigns union members=
benefits to the productive unit.   But for effective and representative unions, steps may be necessary to remove the
restrictions on collective autonomy (whether it be in collective organization, bargaining or conflict resolution) that
have weakened unions= participation in bargaining, especially at the firm level, and have restricted pluralism in
workers= representation.  Decentralizing collective bargaining may increase labor market flexibility by more closely
linking contract provisions to the conditions of the firm.  Similarly, increasing collective autonomy may increase
flexibility if it facilitates direct negotiations and helps the parties to internalize the costs and benefits of their
negotiations.
With the exception of Uruguay and, to a limited degree, Chile, the bargaining systems of the six countries
studied are permeated by state intervention.   In Argentina, Brazil and Mexico states have coopted unions in a tightly
centralized, corporatist system.  In the first two countries, this is achieved structurally through consolidated unions
at an intermediate level.  In Mexico this is achieved through coordination.  In contrast, states have intervened in Chile
and Peru to decentralize the bargaining system.  In these countries, firm-based unions and firm level bargaining are
predominant.  The main form of state intervention in the countries studied is the recognition of unions.  In
Argentina=s and Brazil=s unique systems, the state grants unions a monopoly over representation for categories of
workers.  In Mexico, the representative power of opposition unions, unions that are outside the official labor
movement, is systematically abridged.  In Peru, recent reforms were adopted to curtail state abuse of union
registration.  In Chile, union organization is regulated in detail but unions maintain considerable freedom of
association.        2
  This paper characterizes the collective bargaining systems in six Latin American countries focusing on their
effects on labor market flexibility.
1     The institutional arrangements are analyzed along two dimensions -- the degree
of centralization (v. decentralization) and the degree of state intervention (v. collective autonomy) -- at three levels:
collective association, collective bargaining, and conflict resolution.  Table A compares the collective bargaining
systems of the countries studied.   Table B sets forth a list of questions that guided the analysis. Table C provides
detailed analysis of the collective bargaining systems.  The information summarized in this paper was collected from a
review of labor laws, literature and observations by experts in the field.
2  The paper also describes the overall setting
within which the collective bargaining systems operate.  The paper briefly summarizes arguments on the effects of
institutional arrangements on labor market flexibility and economic performance but does not seek to draw
conclusions on this relationship.
Section 1: The new setting for collective bargaining in Latin America
3
                                                
1The countries selected (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay) together represent over 70%
of the region=s labor force.  They offer different industrial relations models, though common characteristics can be
drawn.
2Emphasis is given to the legal and regulatory framework of the regimes and may not always reflect common
practice in the countries.
3Much of this discussion is taken from Zapata (1995).3
Over more than a decade, the collective bargaining systems in Latin America have been exposed to increasing
pressures and challenges.  During this time, the countries of the region have reoriented their development strategy from
state-led industrialization to market oriented growth, and adopted stabilization and/or economic restructuring reforms,
including varying degrees of commercial and financial liberalization.  These reforms have changed the rules of the game
within which businesses, the state and labor interplay.  First, opening markets has exposed previously protected firms
to new standards of competitiveness.  The scale of production has changed from large, vertically-integrated oligopolies
protected by tariffs, to smaller nuclear production units.
4   Exploiting advances in technology and innovation and
increasing efficiency drive competitiveness strategies (Godio, 1995).
In the transition to market economies, states are redefining their role as economic agents, shifting responsibility
for allocating productive resources, including labor, to the market.  Across the region, states have privatized state-owned
industries, downsized government structures, and shed government employment.  Redefining the state=s role has called
into question the Latin American tradition of state guaranteed employment protections and conditions.  Within this
context the labor market flexibility debate has raged.  Flexibilization generally means making work arrangements more
                                                
4For example, in Latin America the proportion of non-agricultural employment in the formal sector provided
by large businesses fell from 44.1% in 1980 to 30.8% in 1992, and increased in small businesses from 14.6% to 22.5%
(Tokman, 1994).4
flexible to enable firms to adapt to changing economic conditions.
5   There has not been a uniform embrace of
flexibilization of the labor market in the region.   While some countries have adopted explicit moves in that direction,
others have rejected this approach and have reinforced mandated protections.
6 
                                                
5This flexibility to adapt can be achieved through different approaches, including, inter alia, labor cost
flexibility (adjustment of wage and non-wage costs), employment flexibility (adjusting the size of the workforce or the
nature of employment, part time, temporary), work time flexibility (adjusting the hours of the workweek), and
functional flexibility (multi-tasking, increasing the mobility of workers within the firm).  Lagos (1994) argues that an
Aunderground flexibility@ in Latin America has transpired in which the dynamics of the labor market have
overwhelmed the labor market institutions.  Because of the region=s Ainstitutional lag,@ a dynamic flexibilization has
been channeled through a growing informal sector, energetic growth in small enterprises, and downward flexibility in
real wages.
6 Argentina (1976, 1991), Chile (1973, 1987, 1990), Colombia (1990), Cuba (1982, 1990, 1992), Ecuador (1991),
Panama (1986, 1990), Peru (1986, 1987, 1991), and Venezuela (1990) have adopted reforms to Aflexibilize@ their labor
markets while Mexico (1980), the Dominican Republic (1992), El Salvador (1994), Brazil (1988, 1989), Guatemala (1985,
1992), Costa Rica (1993), Paraguay (1992, 1993), and Uruguay (1992) have rejected Aflexibilization.@  This breakdown is
taken directly from Cordova (1996). For a more detailed discussion of those reforms see Bronstein (1997).5
In this new political and economic setting in Latin America, unions= traditional strategy of establishing ties to
the state and political parties to obtain legislated protections and redistributive policies is challenged.
7  Members= welfare
is progressively seen as emanating from the enterprise and increases in productivity.  As a result, collective bargaining
as a means to establish formerly mandated employment conditions and protections has gained significance.   However,
in most of the region, trade union membership is low, as is coverage of collective agreements.  Table D provides a
summary of industrial relations indicators.  Unions face other challenges, including a changing economic landscape, with
a transition from large firms to small firms, the ascension of new key industries, the redesign of production strategies, and
the decentralization of production (whether through the production process via outsourcing or maquila industries, or
geographically through the development of outlying areas, the expansion of MNCs, etc.).  They must also accommodate
a changing labor market, characterized by a growing informal economy, the feminization of the labor force, and high levels
of unemployment (Zapata, 1995).
Section 2: Conceptual issues
The flexibility debate has predominately centered on the impact mandated employment protections and
conditions may have on employment creation and economic performance.  Increasingly, the structure of collective
bargaining and the role of unions are entering the discussion.  The nature and design of collective bargaining systems
impact firms= (and at an aggregated level, the economy=s) ability to reallocate resources and adopt productive strategies
to fit changing economic conditions.   This paper examines the collective bargaining systems along two dimensions that
                                                
7Cortázar et. al. contrast the Aconfrontational@ labor movement and Anon-encompassing elite@ in Latin
America to the Anon-confrontational@ and Aelite encompassing@ experience of East Asia.  They argue that Latin
America=s poor labor dynamism is partially explained by the rent-seeking behavior of politicized unions which
negotiated wage increases over and above the marginal product of labor for a wage-earning cadre.  They were able to
extract these gains from protected firms operating within an inward-looking development strategy biased against
agriculture and exports adopted by the non-encompassing elites.  This resulted in higher urban wages in formal
sectors, less labor intensive production processes, a highly segmented labor market with poor intersectoral allocation
of labor and urban-rural disparities which encouraged migration, exacerbating urban unemployment. In contrast, the
East Asian Aelite encompassing@ development strategy in cooperation with (or suppression of ) a Anon-
confrontational@ labor movement  was labor-demanding and resulted in wage increases and growth in employment
(Cortázar, Lustig, and Sabot, 1998).6
affect labor market flexibility: the degree of centralization of the systems and the extent of collective autonomy.
Decentralization versus Centralization
A decentralized system in which collective bargaining occurs at the firm or within a more fragmented system is
expected to increase flexibility.@
8   Increasing contractual flexibility can increase productivity by better connecting
collective contract provisions to firm conditions and collapsing the distance between situation-specific, firm-based
knowledge and production decisions.   Plus, liberalizing contracting decisions from blunt industry-, sector-, and economy-
wide bargaining rules (as well as from government regulated employment stipulations) may redirect firms= and workers=
attention from redistributive possibilities under these constraints to income generation (Guasch, 1999 citing Heckman,
1997).
9  Pencavel (1997) argues that decentralized bargaining tempers the union=s ability to effect monopoly wage
increases, keeping wages more in line with productivity of the workers in a competitive market.  He also argues that it
mitigates the resource inefficiencies that often result from the pressure-group activity of higher-level unions (such as
populist income policies) and maximizes the beneficial role that unions play as participatory organizations for the workers.
 In decentralized structures unions facilitate worker input to firm decision-making and can thereby increase efficiency and
productivity (though he also notes it can decrease productivity by resisting new technology or protecting unproductive
workers).   Decentralized systems can provide greater pluralism of representation and make it more difficult for states to
coopt labor movements, assuming that firm-based unions are strong (Pencavel, 1997). 
                                                
8Numhauser-Henning (1993).  Also, Kjell G. Salvanes found in an econometric study that centralized wage
bargaining reduced labor market flexibility by reducing the degree of job turnover, though a priori the effect of
centralized wage bargaining is unclear (Salvanes, 1997).
9 See also Cox Edwards (1997).7
Decentralized bargaining systems may better internalize the consequences of the wages/employment trade-off.
But extreme decentralization could produce wage drift if there is a total absence of coordination.  Calmors and Driffill 
(1988) argued that the relationship between the centralization of the wage bargaining system and economic performance
was U-shaped.  On the decentralized end, in competitive markets the firm-based unions would immediately experience
the employment effect of a wage increase.  On the centralized end, the externalities of a wage increase would be
internalized by the union.  The industry-wide union structure of bargaining would produce worse wage-employment
effects because there would be little competition (i.e. among industries) to check the wage increase, and the increases
would be passed on to consumers.  In that structure, enough workers would be outside of the industry so as to fail to
internalize the costs to all workers of the wage increase. 
Recently the OECD 1997 Employment Outlook extended the influential analysis of Calmfors and Driffill on the
structure of bargaining and economic performance to cover the years 1986-1996, and examined statistically the
correlations between measures of centralization and coordination of bargaining and indicators of economic performance.
 The OECD 1997 report found little systematic evidence of a continued U-shaped relationship over the past decade
between the country classification of bargaining systems and economic performance.  However, it found a fairly robust
relationship between cross country differences in earnings inequality and bargaining structures. More centralized
systems have significantly less earning inequality compared to more decentralized ones.  It also found some tendency
for more centralized bargaining systems to have lower unemployment and higher employment rates.  (See Table E for a
summary of findings on economic performance and the structure of collective bargaining provided in the 1997 study.)
Nickell (1997) finds that high unionization and centralized bargaining are associated with higher unemployment.
  Siebert (1997) and Heckman (1997) show the adverse impact on employment creation of centralized bargaining and high
coverage rates, among other labor policies.   OECD (1996) finds that over a 15 year period, net private job creation
dropped by 1 percent in countries with centralized collective bargaining while it increased in decentralized systems by
30 percent.  Cox-Edwards (1996) shows through a simulation model that unemployment would drop by 4 percentage8
points if Argentina were to decentralize its collective bargaining.
10     
                                                
10 Guasch (1999).
There is increasing attention by policy-makers to the merits of decentralized bargaining.  The OECD 1994 Jobs
Study recommended that to increase wage and labor cost flexibility, the industrialized countries Arefocus sectoral
collective bargaining to framework agreements which leave enterprises free to respond flexibly to market trends, provided
they adhere to overall standards; phase out the practice of administrative extension of agreements which impose inflexible
conditions; and introduce >opening clauses= which allow higher level collective agreements to be renegotiated at a lower
level.@   Nonetheless, evidence of the relationship between indicators of economic performance and collective bargaining
is mixed, and there is no clearly preferred industrial relations structure.9
Many factors determine the degree of centralization of a collective bargaining system, including: the type of
unions in which workers organize (firm-based, industry-wide, national unions) the level at which bargaining occurs (firm-
based, multi-firm, industry-wide, national agreements), the degree of coordination between different bargaining units,
11
the use of extension mechanisms (through which workers or employers who are not members of the bargaining parties
are covered by an agreement), and systems of consolidated representation (where, despite the existence of many unions,
one union has a monopoly of representation). Tri-partite bargaining is also a mechanism by which bargaining is extended
to large sectors of the economy and can play an important role in advancing economic and labor reforms.   (See Table
B for some analytic questions regarding the structure of collective bargaining systems.)
Autonomy versus State Intervention
  Increasing autonomy in collective bargaining systems can increase flexibility if it expands the subject and
process by which employers and workers directly negotiate and helps the parties to internalize the costs and benefits
of their negotiations.  Nonetheless, states have frequently curtailed collective autonomy in the name of flexibility (for
example, by restricting bargaining or derogating collective agreements).
                                                
11Co-ordination refers to Athe extent to which the different bargaining levels are integrated so as to prevent
them from mutually blocking their respective purposes.@ It is achieved through pattern (follow-the-leader) bargaining
(OECD, 1994b, 171).
State intervention can take many forms and can serve different purposes, both promoting and restricting
collective bargaining.  It can promote syndical activity by protecting union leaders and members, by mandating leave for
union activities, by establishing employers= duty to bargain, and guaranteeing workers= rights to information in
bargaining.  However, states can also intervene to control union formation, bargaining, and conflict resolution. 
Intervention at any point distorts the autonomy throughout the industrial relations system. Who bargains, what
provisions can be negotiated, and what happens when bargaining strikes a dead end are all important in determining the10
consequences of a given bargaining structure.  When bargaining fails, strikes and conflict resolution procedures are
generally triggered.  In both bargaining and conflict resolution, the potential for direct negotiations and the extent to
which the contracting parties internalize the consequences of their actions are critical.  Systems are distinguished by
whether conciliation and/or arbitration is voluntary or mandatory, and whether rules connect real wage offers with strikes
and strikers replacement or whether strikes are subject to statutory but arbitrary state intervention (See Table B).
Section 3: Characterizing the sample
Collective bargaining systems in Latin America differ greatly.  Although most are characterized by pervasive
state intervention, the forms and degrees of intervention vary, as do their objectives.  In some countries, the state has
intervened to centralize regimes through a tight corporatist framework, such as in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.  
Uruguay is also centralized but is unique for its Aunregulated@ system since the repeal of the restrictive syndical
legislation in that country in 1985.  Mexico is also special case because it is categorized as centralized even though firm-
level unions predominate.  In that country, centralization in bargaining is achieved through coordination, a disciplined
syndical hierarchy, and the state=s coopting of the official labor movement.  In contrast, state intervention in Chile and
Peru has encouraged decentralized systems.  Chile=s system is highly regulated in process but is considered only Aquasi-
interventionist@ because it allows considerable autonomy of the parties in direct negotiations.   Peru=s Aautonomized@
union movement is attributed to high state intervention as well as the prevalence of small firms.
One theory explaining the tendency of state intervention in Latin America is the weakness of the decentralized
systems.
12  Most of the collective bargaining systems in the region are firm-based.  For effective decentralized bargaining,
firm-level unions must be strong.  This is not the case in Latin America.  In most countries, unions depend on the state
for protection, for bringing parties to the bargaining table, for legitimizing agreements, etc.  This dependence has led to
a vicious cycle in which states both protect and control unions.  As opposed to promoting syndical activity, states in
                                                
12Other theories include legalismo, the cultural acceptance that rights are only conferred by laws, and the
historically predominant role of the state in Latin America economies and its obsession to repress or coopt union
power (Uriarte, 1993a).11
the region have frequently coopted labor movements through populist policies and by mandating benefits and
protections, while simultaneously restricting union activity by controlling their formation or actively intervening in
bargaining and conflict resolution (Uriarte, 1993b).
A main point of entry for state intervention is the definition of what types of unions can organize, and in some
cases, requiring state authorization for a union to form.  To coopt unions in a corporatist system, Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico restrict pluralism of representation.  As discussed below, in Brazil, only one union (sindicato) may exist in a given
occupational category, and it has a monopoly on representation of the corresponding workers.  In Argentina, more than
one union may exist, but only the union with union status (personería gremial) can represent workers, call a strike, etc.
 This status is awarded by the state.  The same can be said for Mexico.  While more than one union can exist, only those
union leaders who are certified can engage in collective bargaining or call a strike.  Certification requires that unions be
registered by the state. The registration of unions and the use of separation and exclusion clauses are the main tools used
to preserve Mexico=s corporatist structure.  
The registration of unions also has been a main control over union life in Peru.   However, in this case the state
has intervened to maintain a highly decentralized system with weak unions.  Registration of unions, federations, and
confederations with the Labor Ministry were required for these organizations to acquire legal status.   The decision to
register was often arbitrary and subject to political manipulation.  This problem was addressed in a 1992 law which states
that unions cannot be denied registration if they meet the legal requirements for organization (Villavicencio, 1993). 
The cases of Argentina, Mexico and Peru demonstrate that pluralism in association does not necessarily lead
to pluralistic representation.  This is not the case of Brazil, in which only one union, which has sole representative power,
is allowed in a given category.  In Chile, more than one union may exist in an enterprise and more than one union may
represent workers in collective bargaining.  In fact, Chilean law discourages any form of closed shop or  Amost
representative@ privileges (Romaguera, Echevarría, and González, 1995).  Uruguay is notable for the absence of state
intervention in defining its union life.   However, the pluralism of representation is affected by the Amost representative@12
criteria, which are of the few legal provisions affecting collective labor relations.  However, they are not applied
systematically.
The return from authoritarian to democratic regimes in many of the countries has greatly expanded the
protection of the freedom of association, collective bargaining, and strike as it has improved the protections for other
human, civil, and political rights.  Table F lists the ILO conventions protecting collective activity ratified in the region.
 Up until the last decade, claims before the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association of the suspension or dissolution
of unions in Latin America and in more extreme cases, the intimidation, incarceration, torture or death of union leaders
were not uncommon. Not only were such acts of intimidation allowed by the state, in some cases they were perpetrated
by it.  While such brutal forms of persecution are now uncommon, there continue to be claims of more subtle forms of
anti-union activity, the most frequent of which is the firing of firm-based union organizers or the denial of registration
of the unions by the ministers of labor.  It is argued that these more subtle forms of anti-union behavior are encouraged
by inadequate legal frameworks to prohibit them (Bronstein, 1993).
Section 4: Country profiles
 The following country profiles illustrate that, although some generalizations can be drawn from the countries
studied, the institutional design of their collective bargaining systems varies dramatically.  Table A summarizes the main
characteristics of these systems, focusing on the dimensions of centralization and state intervention.  Table C provides
a more detailed analysis of each countries= institutions, corresponding with some of the analytic questions posed in
Table B.
Argentina=s collective bargaining system is characterized by extensive protection and promotion of union13
activity, permeated at every juncture by state intervention.  The model is based on Atrade union uniqueness,@ in which
the state grants few unions personería gremial, a special union status that confers a monopoly in representing workers
in collective bargaining and strike.  Firm-based unions are not granted union status if a higher-level union is organized.
 The resulting system is highly centralized, with unions and collective agreements largely coalescing by activity or
profession.  Agreements meeting specified criteria can be sanctioned (homologated) by the Labor Ministry, making them
applicable to all workers, be they affiliated or not, in the defined territory.  This tool is used by the government to stipulate
conditions in the agreements, such as including references to use of technology or productivity, and involves a review
of agreements for their impact on the economy and on consumers.  The 1994 Constitution also grants the Executive the
power to rescind collective agreements for economic emergency.   The resolution of collective conflicts is also highly
regulated, including mandatory conciliation prior to any direct action.  By law, a system of voluntary and mandatory
arbitration has been established, thought the Ministry of Labor can intervene at every juncture in the process. 
Brazil=s collective labor system is considered a Amonopoly in transition.@ It is characterized by a history of
strong statism and centralization, with recent moves towards decentralization, private arbitration, and reduction of state
intervention.  The 1988 Constitution prohibits state intervention in the organization or administration of unions,
emphasizes the role of collective bargaining in resolving questions of working conditions, adjustment of wages, etc., and
provides for voluntary arbitration prior to the judicial process.  Despite these reforms, the principle characteristics of the
pre-Constitution collective relations systems remain in tact: monopoly representation by a single union (sindicato) by
category or profession, agreements extended to all workers in a given ambit (affiliated or not), and mandatory
contributions.  The regulation of internal management of the unions was maintained.  Active state intervention was
replaced by judicial enforcement of interventionist laws, thus preserving the corporatist model.  The tri-partite Labor
Courts were also maintained, and mandatory arbitration (the dissidio) predominates despite efforts to increase private
conciliation.  The Courts played a tremendous role in determining labor conditions and benefits, though that influence
has lessened with the increase in union strength and the prominence of collective bargaining.  At each level  (Boards of
Conciliation and Judgement, Regional Labour Courts, and Superior Labour Court, in level of hierarchy) workers= and
employers= representatives are designated to sit on Boards with labor judges.   Since the 1980s, wage determination in14
Brazil has shifted from state regulation to more liberalized collective bargaining.  Unions have strengthened their position
at the regional and industrial levels, slowly increasing their role in wage determination of different groups of workers,
making wage determination less synchronized.
13   Both unions= and employers= organizations are promoting a trend
toward decentralization of the collective bargaining process. While the system does not appear to provide for direct
negotiations at any juncture, there is a trend toward negotiations at the firm level.
Chile=s collective labor relations system is pluralistic and decentralized.   The collective bargaining and conflict
resolution process is regulated in detail in terms of time limits, alternative approaches, etc., but grants considerable
autonomy in direct negotiations to the parties to help resolve their conflicts.  The law favors union pluralism,
discouraging the recognition of special faculties and privileges to Amost representative organizations.@   It allows several
unions to exist for a given firm (with some requirements on number of members) and allows more than one union or
groups of workers to engage in collective bargaining.  Although Chile requires the registration of unions, unions do not
need prior authorization to establish themselves.  Until 1991, only firm level negotiation was allowed.  Thereafter, multi-
firm bargaining was established with the prior consent of the parties.  Nevertheless, the Constitution continues to protect
only firm-level negotiations.   The Constitution tends to prefer protection of negative freedom of association: it provides
that membership is voluntary and that no worker may be forced to affiliate, to dis-affiliate or be prevented from
disaffiliation.  It also prohibits groups from striking more clearly than it establishes that right.  Some argue that the degree
of decentralization of Chile=s system is excessive, that it weakens unions, and limits the coverage of collective
agreements.
14  Recent reforms may be seen as a response to this concern.
Mexico is noted for its strong corporatist system permeated by extra-legal state intervention within an already
legally interventionist system.  The main point of entry for state intervention is the registration of unions.  Most unions
                                                
13Carneiro and Henley (1998) find that the consolidation of intermediate-level unions in Brazil has fueled the
growth of the informal sector.  Their evidence accords with Calmfors’and Driffill’s (1988) argument that intermediate
levels of bargaining, with low synchronization of bargaining and powerful sectoral bargainers, are prone to excessive
wage increase and poor trade off between real wages and unemployment (or, in Brazil=s case, informal employment).
14See Barerra (1995).15
are members of the Confederación de Trabajadores de México (CTM), the labor sector of the ruling party Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), or are members of other federations and confederations which, along with the CTM,
form part of the Congreso del Trabajo.  Although the CTM and PRI are not integrated, they share a symbiotic
relationship.  Unions within the corporatist structure channel and shape labor movement impulses to support the state=s
political and economic policies.
15  In 1997, eight of 47 union federations broke away from the CTM to form an alternative
organization to represent labor at the national level, the Union Nacional De Trabajadores (UNT).  The formation of the
UNT gives cohesion and political clout to the independent labor movement.  Comprised of unions with diverse political
orientation, it attracts members discontent with the CTM and represents a threat to its longstanding supremacy. 
                                                
15Bensusán argues that the subordination of corporatist unions to the state and to employers is reflected in
the fact that the structural adjustment reforms were disproportionately borne by workers despite highly protective
labor legislation.  This Acorporatist flexibility@ is also seen in the social pacts which, though instrumental in
advancing Mexico=s economic reforms, are criticized for signing away workers= wage increases.  She argues that
Mexico=s social peace will be jeopardized if labor market reform to Aflexibilize@ employment conditions are not
accompanied by reforms to remove the current restrictions on union freedom, as well as judicial reform to prevent
continued state intervention in union activity (Bensusán, 1993).
Mexico=s corporatist structure is preserved by the state=s notorious denial of the registration of Aopposition@
unions, which prevents their representatives from participating in collective bargaining or strikes.  It is also strengthened
by the unitary system of representation (in which the union with the majority of members in a firm represent all workers)
and the use of separation and exclusion clauses.  These clauses allow only members of the signatory union to be hired
by a firm.  Workers who disaffiliate must be fired.  Collective autonomy is also circumvented by the practice of Acontracts
of protection,@ in which employers sign agreements that provide minimum benefits to satisfy the Aduty to contract@ and
avoid entering into substantive negotiations.  The state intervenes in collective bargaining and conflict resolution
through the tri-partite conciliation and arbitration boards, which are subordinate to and politically dependent on the
Executive.  In addition to supporting the resolution of economic conflicts, these councils resolve disputes regarding16
registration of unions and their right to negotiate exclusively.  Another common form of state intervention is declaring
a strike Anon-existent@ and, in more extreme cases, declaring the striking entity in bankruptcy, causing the termination of
individual and collective contracts.
Peru=s collective bargaining system is noted for its firm-based structure  (97.42% are firm-based unions,
compared to 2.4% industry wide) and acute state intervention.  Bargaining is decentralized.  Parties are free to choose
the level of bargaining, but the large majority of agreements are signed at the firm-level.  If parties disagree on the level,
agreements are negotiated at the firm.   The system was reformed in 1992, increasing direct negotiation and conflict
resolution by relaxing the collective negotiation process, introducing voluntary arbitration as an alternative to state
administrative decision, and eliminating state approval of agreements.   Prior to the reform, the collective bargaining
process was very rigid and trial-like, designed for resolution by administrative decision.  Nonetheless, the state can still
intervene in the bargaining process and can mandate conciliation and arbitration if strikes threaten firms= or sectors=
economic viability.  The 1992 reform also increased collective autonomy by protecting unions= right to registration.  As
in Mexico, the registration of unions has been a main control over union life in Peru.  Prior to the 1992 Collective Labor
Relations Law, there were no safeguards to the associative rights of unions.  For unions, federations, and confederations
to acquire legal personality, they had to register with the Labor Ministry and the decision to register was often arbitrary
and subject to political manipulation.  The 1992 law defends those rights by stating that unions cannot be denied
registration if they meet the legal requirements. The 1992 reform also increased union pluralism by allowing more than
one union to exist in a firm.  However, the most representative union continues to have a monopoly over representation.
Uruguay=s collective labor relations are characterized by an absence of any institutional framework -- they are,
by and large, Aunregulated.@  The system, however, is centralized.  Industry-wide unions and organizations evolved within
a framework of Consejos de Salarios established to facilitate tripartite negotiations on minimum wage in the private
sector.  As a result of this unified union/organizational structure, collective agreements are usually negotiated at the
industry/sectoral level.  In 1985, the new democratic government repealed the trade union and collective bargaining
legislation enacted by the military.  With the decision not to adopt new legislation on collective relations, Uruguay17
returned to the Aunregulated@ labor relations system that had existed prior to 1973 and continues today.  The Consejos
de Salarios were reconvened, with some modification.  The original Consejos de Salarios were composed of elected
members, while the new councils were composed of members appointed by the representative organizations.   The earlier
council=s decisions were considered arbitration awards, while the reconvened councils recommended wage increases,
subject to government approval and adoption.  Thus, the new councils served as a point of entry for considerable state
intervention.  Beginning in 1990, the Consejos de Salarios were no longer convened, returning to a policy of non-
intervention except for in a few sectors.  Direct negotiation between firms and unions is a widespread practice.
16
Section 5: Trends and convergence
Despite the variance in collective bargaining systems across the region, some experts see a pattern of
convergence between decentralized and centralized systems and autonomous and interventionist regimes (Goldin, 1993a).
 For example, in Argentina, a country noted for its highly centralized system, a 1991 decree allowed parties to modify the
level of negotiations.  It was later decided that if parties could not agree on the level of negotiations, the Labor Minister
should favor the more decentralized level.  In contrast, Chile, a highly decentralized regime, reformed its system to allow
multi-enterprise bargaining for the first time since 1973.   It also legalized the existence of workers= centrals.  The move
towards multi-employer bargaining was taken to try to increase the low coverage rates of collective agreements.
17
                                                
16In their analysis of the effects of reunionization in Uruguay, Allen, Cassoni and Labadie (1996) find that,
with the return to collective bargaining in Uruguay, wages increased in all industries, and even more so in unionized
industries.  Employment and hours worked increased in nonunion industries, thought they did not change in union
industries.  Wages became more compressed and less responsive to macroeconomic conditions.
17In 1993, 9.7% of employed workers and 15.5% of salaried employees were covered in a collective contract
or agreement.  36.1% of workers in small businesses of at least 50 workers, and 1.3% of smaller businesses were
covered by collective agreements.18
There is also movement toward collective autonomy, creating some convergence along that dimension. 
However, it is less apparent since all countries except Uruguay and, to some extent, Chile have interventionist systems.
 Much progress in this regard has been made in the public sector.  Few countries by law deny public employees the right
to organize.  In Argentina, collective bargaining by public employees was allowed and regulated in 1992.  In 1994, Chile=s
civil servants gained the right to establish associations.  Collective autonomy has also advanced in other arenas.  In
Brazil, the 1988 Constitution prohibited state intervention in union approval or administration.  It also provided for private
voluntary arbitration as an alternative to the dissidio and upheld collective bargaining as the only mechanism to worsen
employment conditions. Peru also expanded its collective autonomy by encouraging private voluntary conciliation and
making more flexible the conciliation process.  In Argentina, new contract forms provided by the 1991 National
Employment Act could only be adopted through collective bargaining.
Despite these initiatives for reform, the collective bargaining systems are slow to change.  In Chile, the
Constitution only protects firm-level bargaining and the process for multi-enterprise bargaining is considered too
restrictive.  State intervention prevails, even in those countries that have sought to increase autonomy.   For example,
in Brazil, much of the intervention formerly conducted by the state is maintained through the Labor Court’s enforcement
of interventionist laws.  And intervention in negotiations continues.  In 1994, the Brazilian Minister of Labor refused wage
increases negotiated in the Sao Paulo auto industry because they infringed upon the objectives of the economic
adjustment program recently launched.  And recently in Argentina, the government repealed freely negotiated clauses
in collective agreements in public enterprises to facilitate their privatization (Bronstein, 1995).
One of the more notable trends in the region is the increased impetus for social consultation and tri-partite
bargaining.  With the growth of democracy in the face of structural reforms, states have engaged in social consultation
in an effort to maintain their presence in labor relations and encourage social cohesion and acceptance of reform.  It
played an important role in the return to democracy in Chile and Uruguay.  Pactos Sociales, establishing guidelines for
wage increases, were critical to controlling inflation and restructuring Mexico=s economy.  However, these pacts are19
criticized for being state-imposed rather that resulting from a truly consultative process (Bronstein, 1995).   In 1995, in
response to the economic crisis, the Mexican government negotiated with business and labor, a series of price and wage
pacts to help stabilize the economy.  More recently it negotiated the 1996 New Labor Culture agreement which provided
a series of guidelines to raise salaries in line with increases in productivity (Oxford Analytica, 1998).   See Table G for a
summary of recent examples of social consultation.
Section 6: Implications and reflections
The economic and political reforms adopted over more than a decade have changed the rules of the game in
which business, the state, and labor operate.  Just as businesses and states are redefining their roles, so must unions
define a modus operandi to operate effectively in their changing environment.  However, they are not starting from a
clean slate.  Collective labor relations in Latin America are characterized by pervasive state intervention with the notable
exception of Uruguay.  Historically, states have repressed collective bargaining while emphasizing legislated individual
employment protections and guarantees.  In some countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, union activity was
encouraged but only in as much as it reinforced the corporatist system.  Union dependence on state intervention has
opened the door to intervention at all stages of the collective labor relations (in varying degrees by country): in the
organization of unions, in the negotiation process, and in the resolution of conflicts.
Active labor intervention by states combined with weak unions resulted in a union strategy, which, in general,
has been a political one.  Unions have tried to gain access to the state in order to achieve better employment conditions
and protection (and sometimes redistributive income policies) for its members.  Despite low union density in the region,
unions have been immensely important in the labor movement in Latin America, mainly through policy making. The
tradeoff of this strategy was declining union influence in the sphere of collective bargaining and representation.   This
asymmetrical voice in bargaining and access to state intervention may explain why the region has one of the highest
strike records in the world (See Table D). 20
Recent political and economic reforms have made the role of unions increasingly important.   Nonetheless, they
remain weak.  Membership and the coverage of collective agreements are low.  To a large degree, the blanket provision
of benefits through labor laws, constitutions, and, in some cases, extension of agreements, have taken away incentives
for members to organize in unions.  This disincentive for workers to organize has been compounded when coopted
unions focus on political patronage as opposed to their constituencies= welfare.  Union membership is further strained
by a growing informal economy and an increasingly segmented labor market.   The region=s low collective agreement
coverage rates reflects that the collective bargaining systems are, on the whole, very fragmented and decentralized.  In
some countries, states have made matters worse by suppressing and curtailing collective bargaining to expedite
privatization and increase competitiveness in the face of globalized markets.
  
 The withdrawal of the state from active labor market policies may create space for a Anew unionism@ in which
unions have the freedom and incentive to actively organize their members and represent their interests in collective
bargaining.  Citing Alejandra Cox Edwards, Athe acceptance of market discipline in industrial relations requires the
development of a new type of unionism, that is independent of state controls, is sustained by the voluntary support of
individual workers, and can offer gains from collective bargaining in a competitive environment.@  Integrating collective
bargaining with a market-driven system via voluntary negotiation by firms and workers may require a number of reforms.
 Reforms she cites include: allowing firm-level bargaining, expanding the scope of negotiable items, making union
representation contestable, extending the freedom to organize unions, and reforming labor laws to internalize the costs
of labor disputes, confining them to the parties involved (Cox Edwards, 1997, 128). 
Reforms to protect freedom of association and union activity and to strengthen collective autonomy may be
necessary  to energize this new unionism, and may be necessary corollaries to Aflexibilizing@ the labor systems.  This
includes establishing employers= duty to bargain, protecting workers= rights to information in bargaining, and promoting
collect bargaining activity.  Protecting the right to collective action may also require a dismantling of tightly corporatist
systems to increase pluralism of representation.  Providing true pluralism of representation can help depoliticize labor
movements.  Accomplishing substantive labor reform, whether it be of individual employment protections or collective21
labor laws, requires engaging unions and workers in dialogue.  Continued efforts at social consultation not only can
facilitiate social cohesion through democratic consensus-building but it can also increase the momentum for reform by
inviting workers and their representatives to be stakeholders in the new development strategy (ILO, 1997).22
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Table A: Comparing Collective Bargaining Systems in 6 Latin American Countries
General Characteristics State Intervention Centralization/Decentralization
Argentina High, centralized state intervention.
 Recent efforts to decentralize.
State confers union status (personería gremial - PG) determining
who bargains; labor ministry present throughout process. All
agreements must be registered with administrative authority. 
Homologation powerful tool by state to stipulate bargaining;
considers impact of agreement on economy and consumers.  1994
Constitution recognizes Executive=s power to rescind collective
agreement or parts thereof for economic emergency. State
determines legality of strikes and presides in mandatory
conciliation of disputes and can impose mandatory arbitration.  
Legislation centralizes system; firm-level unions can only
receive PG if no sector level union. Monopoly representation
by unions w/PG who represent affiliated and non-affiliated
workers. 7% of unions represent 75% of workers.  Most
bargaining at higher level; 70% of collective agreements by
activity or branch. Recent reform to decentralize would allow
parties to modify level of negotiations and if disagreement labor
ministry settles dispute, defaulting to lower level.
Brazil Centralized, high state intervention,
mitigated by 1988 Constitution.
Still considered corporatist though
now through judicial intervention.
Monopoly in transition:  movements
towards collective autonomy  and
efforts to decentralize by unions and
employers.
1988 Constitution protects union autonomy; state no longer able
to confer union status or intervene in union administration. 
However, intervention still exists but enforced through Labor
Courts.  Bargaining process not regulated though product is. 
State continues to invoke old Labor Code declaring invalid any
clause of a collective agreement which directly or indirectly goes
against government economic policy.  Labor ministry can initiate
mandatory arbitration through dissidio process in cases of
essential services.  Dissidio process triggers mandatory
conciliation and arbitration by tri-partite courts.
1988 Constitution maintained corporatist structure.  Only one
union with sindicato status can represent a profession by
industry in geographic territory.  Law doesn=t allow for firm-
based unions.  Sindicatos can bargain at firm level or sector
level; oftentimes pursued a bi-level strategy to avoid the salary
limits imposed by government policy.  Trend toward
decentralization.  1988 Constitution provides that workers in
firms of more than 200 employees have right to 1 elected
representative to promote direct negotiations with employer.
Chile Decentralized, mixed state
intervention; recuperation of
collective autonomy w/ return to
democratization, but still
intervention in conflict resolution.
Unions don=t need state approval to form, but  process is regulated,
as is internal administration.  Unions report yearly to state. 
Bargaining process highly regulated but allows autonomy in
negotiations.  Also  Aunregulated bargaining@ process but doesn=t
carry strike option.  Agreements can=t limit employer=s Aability to
organize, control, and administer the firm.@   Parties can opt for
voluntary mediation or arbitration at any time during bargaining. 
State can impose mandatory arbitration to end Aabusive strike.”  
Strike process regulated in detail.
Most unions at firm-level. Constitution only protects firm-level
bargaining. More than 1 union can exist per firm and sign own
collective agreement. 1991 reform allows multi-employer
bargaining (unless enterprise subsidized more than 50%by
state) to improve coverage rates, but process considered too
restrictive. Also established right to organize national trade
union organization, centrales. Social consultation important in
transition to democracy.
Mexico Degree of centralization achieved
through corporatist structure and
union discipline;  high state
intervention
Main intervention through state registration of unions and in
strikes.  Independent or opposition unions outside the corporatist
structure frequently not registered and strikes suppressed. 
Exclusion and separation clauses maintain system. Bargaining
autonomy circumvented by unions who satisfy duty to sign by
signing minimum agreements (Acontracts of protection@). State
intervenes in conflict resolution through conciliation and
arbitration boards and by declaring strikes non-existent. 
Negotiation process not highly regulated, but integrated with
conflict resolution (usually occurs in conciliation) in which there
is high state intervention.
Different types of unions allowed, though most firm-level.
Union with majority represents all workers in firm.  Highly
disciplined syndical movements achieve coordination in
bargaining.  Industry-wide law contracts must be approved by
labor ministry, but few signed.  Tri-partite bargaining and
pactos sociales play integral role in the adjustment process
and recovery from economic crisis.
Peru Decentralized, high state
intervention.  System reformed in
1992 to increase direct negotiation
and decrease state intervention.
Main intervention through registration of unions and conflict
resolution.  1992 reform establishes that unions can only be
denied registration for non-compliance of legal requirements. 
Improved room for direct negotiations. Post 1992 reform,
agreements don=t need approval of state. But, 1991 decree
prohibits collective agreement from granting wage indexation in
state enterprises replacing existing clauses with mechanisms that
take into account productivity. State can still intervene to review
demands and economic records.  Conflict resolution procedures
reformed to increase direct negotiations.  Before bargaining system
was rigid, procedural and trial like, designed for resolution by
administrative decision. If no agreement after 8 days mandatory
conciliation.  Now, conciliation process more flexible. 1992 strike
regulated in detail.  State can mandate conciliation, and arbitration
if strike lasts too long and threatens firm or sector.
Decentralized.  Firm-based unions dominate (97.42% at firm
level, only 2.4% industry wide). 1992 reform allowed more than
1 union per firm; most representative union has monopoly on
representation.  Workers can represent selves if no union
organized.  Parties choose level of agreement; if no consensus,
defaults at firm level. Almost all agreements signed at firm-level.
Uruguay Centralized, low state intervention Since 1985 repeal of syndical legislation, collective bargaining
system Aunregulated.@ No law defines or requires registration of
unions, or governs collective bargaining or conflict resolution. 
Mutual good faith that agreements will be abided underlies
Some firm-based unions, but most industry wide because
evolved within old framework of tri-partite Wage Councils. 
Most bargaining sector-wide. If more than one union exists and
don=t agree to negotiate jointly, Amost representative union@28
system.  During conflicts, unions mainly self-regulating via
provisions in their charters or collective agreements.
bargains. Social consultation important in transition to
democracy.
Source: Author=s analysis.
Table B.  Questions to consider when analyzing collective bargaining systems
I. Collective Association
State Intervention versus Collective Autonomy
C  Are the types of unions in which workers can organize defined by law? 
C  Are there minimum requirements to form unions, including objectives, number of members, contents of by-laws, etc.?
C  Must a state authorize the existence of a union, its registration?
C  Can a union be dissolved by administrative act? 
C  Are there protections or promotions of union activity? 
C  Are  membership and dues voluntary?  
Centralization versus Decentralization
C  Is union organization restricted to a particular level (ex. by firm or activity)?
C  Can more than one union exist in a given level? 
C  Can more than one union represent workers in a given level?
II. Collective Bargaining and the Collective Contract
State Intervention versus Collective Autonomy
C  Do employers have a duty to negotiate or contract?
C  How is representation in the bargaining process determined? 
C  Are protections afforded to the negotiating parties? 
C  Is the bargaining process regulated or autonomous, rigid or fluid? 
C  Is the content of the negotiations restricted? 
C  Can agreements reduce benefits by mutual agreement?  Do benefits expire with the collective agreement?
C  Is state approval of the contract necessary for its validity?  Can states derogate collective agreements?
C  Can workers represent themselves? 
C  Do workers have a right to company information in bargaining?
Centralization versus Decentralization
C  How is the level of negotiations determined? 
C  Are multiple levels of negotiation allowed and how are they articulated? 
C  Can more than one union or group of workers bargain? 
C  Is coverage of the agreement limited or general? 
C  What kind of extension mechanisms exist and how are they triggered?
C  Is bargaining coordinated through social consultation?
III. Collective Conflicts and their Resolution
State Intervention versus Collective Autonomy
C  Who can call a strike: unions? workers? 
C  Is the strike process regulated? 
C  Are there conditions for a legal strike? 29
C  Is there a maximum duration?
C  Can workers in the public services strike?
C  How are the strike process and conflict resolution procedures integrated? 
C  Is conciliation mandatory?  Arbitration? 
C  How much opportunity is there for direct negotiation?28
Table C: Dissecting the Collective Bargaining Systems
Country In what types of unions can workers  organize? Is union affiliation voluntary?  Dues? Is  there protection/promotion  of collective activity?
Argentina 3 types:   firm, economic activity, and occupation.  Federations
and confederations exist.
Membership voluntary but restricted by monopoly on
representation.  Contrib not mandated by law, but collective
agreements can make them mandatory for members and non-
members.
1994 Constitution guarantees elected and representative union
leaders freedoms to carry out their union duties and 
employment stability.  1988 law  expanded  protections.
Brazil Workers organize by defined occupational categories .  Law
doesn=t provide for firm-based unions, but  sindicatos often have
representation at the firm level.  Federations, confederations and
centrals allowed.
Membership voluntary,  protected by Constitution.  However,
restricted b/c only 1 union represents all workers (affiliated or
not) so non-affiliated can=t find representation in other union.
Contributions mandatory (union tax)  for all employed workers,
members or not. 
Law protects union leaders; once registered as board of
director candidates, workers cannot be fired, and if elected
cannot be fired until one year following  term.
Chile 4 types: enterprise unions, inter-enterprise unions, unions for the
self-employed, and unions for temporary workers.  Also,
federations, confederations, and since 1991 workers  centrals
allowed. 
Membership voluntary, protected by Constitution. Dues are
mandatory (if absolute majority of members approve) employer
must deduct.  1991 law requires employers who extend union
collective agreement to non-members to assess 75% union dues.
1991 reform  strengthened promotion and protection measures
and extended protection to all workers involved in collective
bargaining 10 days prior to the presentation of the draft
collective contract until the  contract is signed or the parties
are notified of an arbitration award.
Mexico 6 types:  occupation, firm-based, multi-firm, industry, and trade
unions, university workers= unions. Also  federations and
confederations.
Freedom of association protected by Constitution, but limited
by lack of pluralism in system and contradicted by allowing
exclusion clauses and separation clauses in collective agreements
that make employers hire only union members and fire members
who disaffiliate.  Requirement of  Aactive service@ excludes
temporary and self-employed workers.  Dues determined by
unions. 
Exclusion and separation clauses in collective agreements
undermine collective freedom. Union leaders protected by
same provisions for workers fired with unjust cause.
Peru 4 types of unions:  firm-based;  by activity (of 2+ businesses); 
by profession (2+businesses); and mixed unions comprised of
diff professions, businesses, or activities in a geogr territory that
don=t meet min requirements to form other union. Since 1992, 
direct affil avail in supra-firm unions.  Unions can be local,
regional or national.  Also federations (2 unions+) &
confederations (2 federations+) exist. 
1994 Constitution guarantees union freedom, not as explicitly as
1979 Constitution which est workers= right to unionize w/o
prior authorization, and guaranteed neg. assoc. freedom.  Law
states that affiliation is free and voluntary, and members are free
to disaffiliate at any time (providing employer 5 days notice).
Unions determine quotas in their statutes, employer must deduct
contribution at petition of union w/ written authorization  of
workers.
1979 Constitution provided union leaders greater protection;
1993 Constitution guarantees union freedom more
generically, and does not articulate protections. 1992 law
dramatically reduced  protections which cover only union
leaders not members, only protects against acts of dismissal
and transfer, and only protects against abuse by employers
and not the state.
Uruguay No law defines or recognizes union types.  Most unions are by
economic branch or industry level, mainly because the system
evolved within the framework of the old  tri-partite Consejos de
Salarios.  However, firm-based unions also exist. 
Voluntary membership and collection of dues (though some
unions have managed to turn dues into payroll deductions). 
Constitutional protection of freedom of association, but not
negative freedom -- though this right not disputed.
Protection of collective association considered insufficient. 
Main legal provisions  are in Constitution and not in labor
law.  Constitution assigns ratified international conventions 
priority over national laws.  Thus ratified  ILO Conventions
87 and 98  and ILO charter  regulate the trade union freedom
guaranteed by the constitution. Doctrine and professional
practices are also very important in defining  labor relations. 29
Country Is the negotiation process regulated? Is there a duty to bargain? a right to information? How is the level of negotiation determined?
Argentina Yes, but not until 1988. Law defines active role for the state. 
Labor Minister initiates bargaining on request. Parties must
form negotiating committee w/in 15 days. Parties can directly
negotiate or under coordination of labor ministry delegate.
Yes, parties have 15 days to form negotiating committee. Also parties have duty
to bargain Ain good faith@.
Parties choose level of negotiations, since legis. favors unions by
activity most bargaining occurs at this level.  If dispute over level, state
resolves by admin decision,  favoring lower level.
Brazil No, process not regulated though instrument is.  Negotiations
mandatory once a year. Workers approve final product.
Duty to negotiate, but only Agood faith@ requirement is that parties show up. 
Parties determine date.  If party refuses to bargain, can file dissidio.
Level of negotiation is parties= choice.  Sindicatos can bargain at the
firm level or category level.  Unions often pursue a bi-level strategy in
which they negotiate floor adjustments at national level and improve
upon at firm level.  Unions have attempted to negotiate more at firm
level to avoid salary limits imposed by government policy. 
Chile 2 forms of negotiation: regulated yielding collective contract and
unregulated yielding collective agreement (no strike option).  
Formal negotiations are regulated in detail (including formation
of bargaining committees, intervals for submitting drafts and
replies, etc.) however, there is considerable autonomy in the
negotiations.  Informal negotiations are conducted by mutual
agreement of parties.
Employers have a qualified duty to negotiate at firm level only.  They also have a
duty to share necessary information with the unions to fulfill their bargaining
duties.
1973-1991 collective bargaining restricted to  enterprise level.  1991
system reformed to allow multi-enterprise bargaining w/prior agreement
by parties, but considered too restrictive and no duty to bargain at this
level.  Mainly reformed because low coverage of collective agreements
(1993 only 10% workers covered).
Mexico Negotiation process of collective contract  not regulated, though
agreements  must be revised at least every 2 years.  Bargaining
usually occurs in conciliation proceedings after workers exercise
right to strike. Although it  is customary for workers to call a
strike in anticipation of revising a contract it is not required.
Because bargaining and conflict resolution procedures are
integrated (and state intervenes in conflict resolution) state
intervention permeates the bargaining process.  Negotiation of
industry-wide Law Contracts is highly regulated and state
intervention is clearly defined.
Employers have duty to contract: if an employer employs  unionized workers and
they request a collective agreement, the employer must bargain and sign an
agreement.  Some employers get around this by signing with a puppet union 
Acontracts of  protection@  which satisfy procedural requirements but offer no more
than  minimum standards set by law.  Only way union can challenge this is to
establish that it represents majority of workers and should have negotiated the
agreement.
Firm level negotiations are common.  Collective agreements: 1+ unions
and 1+ employers;  law contracts: compulsory and cover all unions and
employers in given category and territory -- not very common.  Firm
level internal regulations and direct negotiations common through
mixed boards. 
Peru Regulated, but reformed in 1992 to be less so.  Pre-1992,
process was similar to trial and integrated with conflict
resolution processes over which labor ministry presided. Post
reform: unions present employer with proposal (or labor
authority if activity level).  Negotiations must occur w/10 days
of presentation and carried out according to parties. Committee
must be formed with equal representation.  Conflict can stand
unresolved or parties can opt for arbitration or strike.  
Duty to negotiate; parties must meet within 10 days.  Workers= have a right to
information about the economic and financial and social conditions of the firm.
Parties select level of negotiations by mutual agreement, if no
consensus, defaults at firm level.  If agreement already exists, then
substitute or complementary agreement can only be negotiated at other
level if mutual agreement to do so, can=t be done by admin or arbitral
decision.  Internal labor regulations govern the internal operations of
firm and are mandatory for firms w/100 or more workers.  These must
be approved by labor authority.  
Uruguay No.  There is no general duty to bargain, no collective
bargaining procedures, no regulations on level of agreements,
their substance or duration.  An underlying and mutual faith that
agreements will be abided by underlies the system.  System of
tripartite negotiations (Consejos) were resurrected after 1985
return to democracy, but ceased in 1990 to encourage bilateral
negotiations.
No duty to bargain. Collective agreements can be signed at firm, multi-firm, or industry
level depending on the level of the  bargaining union.  However, an
outgrowth of the Consejos, most bilateral negotiations occur at
sectoral/industry level through the Amost representative union@,
federation, or group of unions.  Bargaining at the firm level often
supplements general agreements to fit peculiarities of firm, ie. job
stability, new technology.30
Country Is the content of negotiations restricted? Do contract terms expire with contract? Can negotiations worsen contract terms or legal minimums?
Argentina Prior to 1991 not restricted though topics were suggested;
subsequently, required that agreements include incorp of new
technology, training systems, classification systems, link
productivity and wages, information and consultative
mechanisms, etc.  Later held that agreements would only be
homologated if took into account criteria of productivity,
investment, new technology, and professional development.
Provisions continue beyond the life of agreement if new contract not entered
into (ultraactividad). Hence, unions often reluctant to negotiate.  1990 decree
revoked carry over provisions making it possible to negotiate new agreements
for privatized state owned enterprises. 1995 law provides that collective
agreement provisions specific to small businesses no longer have force 3
months after expiration unless negotiated otherwise. As of 1997, 85% of
agreements had lapsed but clauses remained in effect due to ultraactividad.
A collective agreement can worsen benefits provided in a previous
agreement.
Brazil Maximum duration 2 years. Much of content is already
established by law  since Constitution and labor codes noted for
setting minimum standards for most conditions (workdays,
holidays, vacations, wages).
It is in debate whether  provisions not replaced by another agreement continue
to have force (ultraactividad).
1988 Constitution provides that salaries and workday can only be
reduced through collective negotiation and not through labor
courts.  Only through mutual agreement can parties reduce or
revoke benefits they have established in prior contracts. 
Chile Can include any issue relating to compensation or other benefits
and working conditions, but can=t limit employer=s ability to
organize, control and administer the firm, or restrict the
production, planning or management of the enterprise.  Contract
has to be 2 years minimum.
Collective contracts  must proclaim that other benefits and conditions
included in previous contracts are null and void.
Agreements cannot  violate existing statutory norms or labor
contracts.  1995 proposal that firms with more than 100 workers
could negotiate with union the suspension of work relations, 
reduction of workday or modification of working arrangement for
economic or technological reasons.
Mexico Law requires that collective agreements include names, addresses
of the employers, the businesses and establishments it covers,
its duration, the work day schedule, leave, vacation, salaries,
training of personnel.  Only critical element in reality is salaries.
 Can also include formation of mixed boards, and separation and
exclusion clauses.
Collective  agreements terminated by mutual consent, at expiration of job, or
going out of business of establishment.  If no petition to revise, agreement
extended for period equal to original term.  Law Contracts  end by mutual
consent or failure to agree to revise.  Appears that provisions of  coll
agreements continue after they expire unless revised b/c provisions are
incorporated into individual contracts.
No contracts can reduce benefits established by law. Collective
agreements cannot negotiate worse conditions than those in
existing contracts, but employers can petition to revise
agreements to worsen benefits upon expiration.  In economic
conflicts, conciliation and arbitration boards  can reduce
personnel, salaries, work conditions as long as meets legal 
minimum standards.
Peru Scope of domestic legislation provides ample  workers=
protection so little room in collective bargaining. Nonetheless,
includes remunerations, working conditions, productivity
(explicit reference to in 1992), as well as leave and other forms of
promoting union activity, which were established by law pre-
1992, but now left to collective agreements. Collective
agreement must last min 1 year.
Provisions of collective agreements no longer have effect once agreement
expires unless some provisions were agreed  to be permanent or extended.
Neither collective conventions nor administrative resolution can
reduce the benefits and conditions provided workers by law or
regulation.  Collective agreements can reduce benefits collectively
bargained, though these cannot be reduced by administrative
decision.
Uruguay Not regulated.  Usually provisions cover min wages by job
category, wage adjustment procedures, working condition, work
day, adoption of new technologies, etc.  Duration of contract
usually 1 year.
Traditional doctrine asserts that most beneficial collective contract provisions
have effect after expiration or replacement by other contract.  Contrary doctrine
claims that clauses expire with old contract and thus have no force or  can be
worsened.
In debate whether an agreement can worsen  conditions of
previous contract b/c principle of preserving and surpassing
establishes that the norm most favorable and the condition most
beneficial govern.31
Country Is there pluralism of representation? Can workers represent themselves in negotiations? Who is covered by collective agreements?
Argentina No, system euphemistically characterized as Aunion pluralism with unitary
representation@ but state grants personería gremial(PG) which confers monopoly
on bargaining, strikes, administering social security programs, and political
processes. The  Amost representative@ criteria criticized as not very objective since
data on union membership is self-proclaimed.  Also, Amost rep@ union may be
Amost  rep@ at the macro level, while another union may be Amost rep@at the firm
level.
No, union with personería gremial  represents affiliated and non-
affiliated workers.  Constitution guarantees union=s right to collective
bargaining.
If agreement homologated then covers all workers in area of
signatory union, binding on all respective employers.  If
not, employer decides if covers non-affiliated workers
Brazil No, while more than 1 union can exist in a given professional category, only 1 has
representative power.  Criteria for most representative union: number of members,
social welfare services provided, value of property and assets.
Rarely.  1988 Constitution affirmed that collective bargaining can only
be conducted through unions (though employers can represent selves in
firm agreements).  However, if no union or federation or confederation
exists to represent unions they can represent selves.  1988 Constitution
moved towards direct negotiation by providing that workers of any
enterprise with more than 200 employees have right to 1 elected
representative to promote direct negotiation with employer. 
Collective conventions cover all workers in  corresponding
profession and all  firms in  economic category in the
geographic area.  Collective agreements only cover the
firm(s) in which the workers pertain to the professional
category of the signatory union, though employers generally
extend  provisions to non-member workers of the same
profession.
Chile Yes. Law discourages Amost representative unions@.  Several unions can exist in a
given establishment and each can negotiate their own agreement.
Groups of workers can represent themselves.  However, workers of
enterprises with less than 16 employees do not meet the membership
requirements for collective bargaining, or of enterprises with less than 1
year of operation.
Collective contracts only cover  union=s members at signing
of the contract; employer may extend  benefits to all firm
workers by mutual consent ( but it then must deduct 75% of
monthly union dues from those non-members) Or  6
months after joining firm, new  workers can negotiate their
own agreement.
Mexico No.  Union with majority signs collective agreement, has exclusive representation
in firm. If more than 1 union (of same type or different levels) one with more
members negotiates. Guild unions can negotiate jointly or with other types of
unions.
Workers cannot represent themselves in collective bargaining
agreement.  Though they can enter into negotiations with employer, the
agreement doesn=t carry right to  strike.
Collective agreement is extended to union=s members and
current and future workers of signing employer.  Law
contracts are compulsory to all unions (and workers) and
employers in corresponding category.
Peru Yes.  Pre-1992, only 1 union allowed in workplace, had monopoly of  repres and
collective agreements have erga omnes effect.  Post reform, more pluralistic b/c 
more than one union per firm (often 1 for workers, 1 for employees) allowed, but
monop repres maintained for Amost representative union,@ union with majority
members.  If more than 1 union have to coop to achieve majority must agree on
how to divide representation (if proportional, etc.) 
Workers can represent selves if there is not a union to represent them. 
In this case, absolute majority elects 2 representatives.
If union members are absolute majority of firm, then
agreement is applicable to all workers (incl. subsequently
hired workers), if not, only applies to affiliated members.  If
agreement is at activity level, and unions and employers
represent majority in the industry, the agreement has erga
omnes effect.
Uruguay Yes, more than 1 union can represent workers of a firm by mutual agreement.  If
dispute, law establishes criteria for Amost representative union.@
Only if union not organized, then workers can, by request of 1/3 of
them,  elect representatives to negotiate on their behalf.
Collective agreements only binding on  contracting parties,
but provisions are extended to all workers of the firm(s) 
Agreements could be homologated through the Consejos
Salarios and affect all firms in the sector, but  only
necessary if conventions  provide health insurance or if in
construction sector.   Consejos system now voluntary.
Country What are the conditions for a legal strike? How are strikers treated? What about strikes in public services?33
Argentina Strike must be carried out according to the statutes of striking
union (which must have personería gremial),  must  be intended
for admissible purpose (not political), and have exhausted
mandatory conciliation. Constitution guarantees this union right.
Strikers can=t be replaced, unless strike judged illegal in which case strikers
can return to work.  Strikers not paid unless strike is legal and employer
provoked strike.
1990 right to strike in public sector regulated.  Minimum level of
essential services (services whose total or partial interruption would put
in danger the life, health, liberty or security of individuals) guaranteed
by arrangement of the organization or labor minister.  If not provided,
mandatory arbitration.
Brazil 1989 strike law replaced concept of illegal strike with the Aabusive
strike@, in which case workers can be fired. Strikes allowed when
negotiations in deadlock and parties haven=t resorted to
arbitration.  48 hrs notification to employer (72 hrs if essential
services.) After dissidio is issued, strike is considered abusive. 
1988 Constitution established the right to strike as a workers=
right. 
Strikers can=t be replaced or fired  during the strike, unless strike ruled
Aabusive.@  1989 law states that during strike, employment contract is
suspended - interpreted to mean employers don=t remunerate workers during
strike.
1988 Constitution granted public employees right to organize and strike
(except military). 1989 strike law defined essential services and made
workers= and employers= unions responsible for  delivery of minimum
services.  Authorities could initiate a dissidio if min services not
provided. 78 hrs notice required. No economic act can violate or
constrain fundamental rights and guarantees.
Chile If negotiations deadlocked, workers= bargaining committee can call
secret vote to strike before a Minister of Faith.  Employers= last
offer must be displayed. (If multi-enterprise negotiations each
enterprise must vote).  Strike must take place 3rd working day
after vote.
Employers may hire replacement workers on 1st day of strike if last offer
contained at least equal provisions of original contract readjusted acc to law;
on 15th day after final offer presented if it is corrected to meet criteria above;
or 15th day after strike.  Workers not paid, can seek temporary work, can
reintegrate workforce between 15-30 days of strike depending on final offer. If
50%+ workers return to work, strike ends.
1980 Constitution and 1989 Law prohibits public servants as well as 
people who work in corporations or enterprises operating public utilities
or with financial links to the state or whose services or products
significantly affect the provision of public needs to strike.  Three
ministries annually identify  the branches of activity fitting these
circumstance.
Mexico Conciliation and arbitration boards can declare strikes Anon-
existent@ unless strike claims legal purposes (to achieve balance
between forces of production, celebrate collective or law contract,
demand fulfillment of contract, revise salaries, fulfill profit-
sharing); is supported by majority employees; presents petitions
to employer via authority establishing  terms of strike. Declared
illegal if majority workers execute violent acts, in times of war, or
continue to strike after declared Anon-existent@.  Union must give
6 days notice (10 days for public services).  The Constitution
guarantees workers= right to strike but in practice it is a union
right.
If strike legally Aexistent@ then all employment contracts suspended. 
However, strikers can=t be fired or replaced.  They can quit strike at any
time.  Workers not paid wages replacement during strike unless board rules
conflict is imputable to the employer.
Strikes in public services limited to general and systematic violation of
rights granted by Constitution. Must be supported by 2/3 dependencia
and declared legal by Tribunal Federal de Conciliación y Arbitraje.
Essential services not specifically addressed in law, but need 10 days
notice if strike in specific services, also maintenance of services during
strike in enterprises dealing with ships, airplanes, trains, hospitals,
sanatoriums, clinics, etc.  State has intervened via administrative
procedure, declaring bankruptcy, alleging crime of social dissolution to
striking workers, declaring confiscation.
Peru With 1992 reform, right to strike more systematically regulated.
To be admissible  majority of  workers must vote to strike and
strike must support proper objectives.  Labor authority can declare
illegal if strike occurs even though ruled inadmissable, involves
violence against people or goods, fails to provide minimum
service, occurs after conflict ended by arbitral decision.  This is a
worker=s right. 
Workers can=t be replaced, they don=t receive compensation, though they
continue to accrue seniority.  Once strike declared, none of the workers
(except indispensable workers) can work until strike ended.
Prior to 1992, law didn=t provide framework for dealing with essential
services. Now law defines essential services and requires that the
enterprise or public entity determine the minimum services to be
delivered during a strike and notify the labor authority, public authority
and unions.  If no agreement reached on provision of services then
conflict submitted to mandatory tripartite arbitration.34
Uruguay The only condition for a legal strike is strikers= giving 7 days
fore-warning, but even this provision not really followed in
practice and carries no real repercussion.  It is debated whether the
right to strike is a union right. In practice workers can declare a
strike against the wishes of their union.
Wages aren=t paid though seniority is maintained and leave accrues.  Generally, resistance to acknowledging public sector right to strike. 
Public authorities empowered to compel workers to provide minimum
operation of essential services (through emergency shifts and use of
goods and hiring labor) to ensure continuity of vital services, defined by
Labor Office.  These laws annulled but provisions still invoked by
government. 33
Country Can the state legally derogate collective
agreements?
Is there conciliation or arbitration of conflicts? Does the state intervene in conflicts?
Argentina 1996 Decree empowers labor minister to revoke in
part or completely the homologation of agreement. 
1994 Constitution recognizes Executive power to
rescind by decree collective agreement for reasons of
economic emergency.  1990 decree made it obligatory
to rescind all collective agreements in the public
sector as a prior step to renegotiating them.
Conciliation of economic conflicts is mandatory.  Labor ministry is active
throughout.  15 days for resolution.  Some collective agreements establish
conciliation procedures including the convening of  Paritary Commissions presided
by labor ministry officer. Parties can agree to voluntary arbitration if conciliation
fails.  Must abide by arbiter=s decision (usually from the labor ministry).
Labor ministry can order conflict back to status ante, can impose mandatory
arbitration if collective conflicts affect economic activity, productivity and
national development and progress or the welfare of the community; or if
minimum level of essential services not provided. This is an emergency
measure rarely used.  Labor ministry can call a strike illegal or oblige parties to
suspend strike for  negotiation for 15 to 20 days.
Brazil The 1967 labor codes declared invalid any clause of a
collective agreement or convention which, directly or
indirectly, goes against any disciplinary rule or
prohibition of the government=s economic policy or
concerning the wage policy in force. Debated whether
Constitution annulled these provisions by prohibiting
interference of the labor authorities into collective
autonomy.  Nonetheless, in Sept. 1994, Minister of
Labor refused to approve the wage increases negotiated
in the Sao Paulo automobile industry, because  they
infringed upon objectives of the economic adjustment
program.
System dominated by mandatory arbitration.  A  dissidio coletivo (claim)  triggers
mandatory conciliation.  These actions first go to the Board of Conciliation and
Judgment.  If no agreement reached, this board pronounces judgment which can be
appealed to Regional Labor Court then Superior Labor Court. 1988 Constitution
for first time provides for private voluntary arbitration to substitute the dissidio
process but rarely used. Also pronounced that Court=s decision must respect
collective agreement provisions in addition to the laws and respect the managing
autonomy of the firm.
State can initiate a dissidio process to end a dispute if minimum level of
essential services not provided.  1988 Constitution annulled states power to
convene parties to mesas redondas if there was a delay in collective
negotiations or if one party refused to negotiate. 1992 Decree conferred this 
mediation function  to the labor ministry but only upon request of the parties. 
Article 623 of labor codes  prohibits a court from issuing a decision conflicting
 with the state=s economic policy.
Chile There is considerable autonomy in negotiations. Prior to 1973,  conciliation through the Juntas Permanents de Conciliación were
mandatory, but  abolished thereafter.  Law provides for voluntary mediation in
which parties agree upon own mediation procedures or use those established by
law.  Rarely used.
President (with Minister of Labor and Social Security, National Defense and
Economy, Dvpt and Reconstruction) can end strike by Executive Decree if
jeopardizes public health, basic food supplies, and national economy or
security.
Mexico Admin authority determines whether law contract
should be negotiated and must approve law contract
for it to be valid.  Not clear whether conciliation and
arbitration  boards can reject agreements submitted.
Conciliation and arbitration (C&A) boards  have equal representation of workers,
employers and chaired by govt rep.   Workers= union may submit conflict  to
arbitration before these boards. Employer may  refuse to submit to arbitration.
Arbitration of economic conflicts before C&A boards similar to trial with stages of
fact gathering, hearings, and submission of evidence.  In arbitral award of
economic conflicts, C&A board can increase or decrease the number of persons
employed, the daily and weekly hours of work and wages, and more generally,
alter conditions of employment in the enterprise or establishment.
State has  unlimited capacity to intervene in disputes which concern it, though
not by law.  Main forms of intervention: through conciliation and arbitration
boards, by  declaring strike Anon-existent,@ via requisa or administrative
intervention in public services, or declaring striking entity in bankruptcy  to
terminate labor contracts of strikers.  C&A boards have budgetary and political
dependence on state, so often  vehicle for state intervention in collective labor
relations. 
Peru Since 1981 wage adjustment clauses established by
state.  State declared invalid clauses of collective
agreements establishing wage indexing.  Also, 1991
Parties can opt for  private conciliation or ask Min of Labor to assign a team of
conciliators. New  conciliation  process flexible and simple.   Pre-1992 reform,
process much more rigid and adversarial.  Following negotiations or conciliation,
1992 reform increased direct conciliation eliminating the rigid adversarial
structure which facilitated state intervention.  Nonetheless, state can still
impose mandatory conciliation and arbitration if it deems it necessary and34
decree prohibits collective agreements from granting
wage indexation in state enterprises, derogating
existing clauses and replacing them with adjustment
mechanisms that take into account productivity.
either party can choose to submit conflict to arbitration or strike.  Workers can=t
strike while conflict in arbitration, but can submit conflict to arbitration (with
employer=s agreement) after strike begun. Mandatory arbitration if no resolution of
conflict in essential services, or if strike continues too long and endangers viability
of firm, sector, is violent, or serious in other ways.
convenient. State=s power to declare a service Aessential@ considered a threat to
right to strike.   1992 law establishes that if strike continues too long and
endangers viability of firm, sector, is violent, or other way serious, state can
order resumption of work, and if no resolution of conflict the minister of labor
resolves.  State has also declared strikes by Centrales against their economic
policy illegal on political grounds. 
Uruguay In debate whether can derogate previous contract b/c
principle of preserving and surpassing establishes that
the norm most favorable and the condition most
beneficial govern.  See above.
No institutional framework governs dispute resolution.  Unions self-regulate
during conflict (following provisions in their statutes or collective agreements),
including attempting conciliation and forewarning of strikes.  Settlements arise
through self resolution.  Voluntary arbitration rarely used.  No mandatory
arbitration.  Collective agreements sometimes include clauses regulating
arbitration procedures.
Overall, state can=t intervene in conflicts (unless invited as  a mediator). 
However, can take necessary measures to ensure continuation of essential
services, defined by Executive Branch, or call a plebiscite on strike.  Can=t
impose mandatory arbitration.35
Table D.  Indicators of Industrial Relations
Trade Union Density (%) Collective Bargaining
Coverage Rates
Strike Activity
Non-agric labor force Formal sector
(wage earners)
(% employees covered) 1000's of workers involved
Country
1980s 1990s 1990s 1995 1990 1995
Argentina 48.7 25.4 65.6 72.9
Bolivia 16.4 59.7 11.1
Brazil 32.1 66 14243 3806
Chile 11.6 15.9 33 12.7 25 25
Colombia 11.2 7 17 42 10
Costa Rica 22.9 13.1 27.3 26 43
Dom. Rep. 18.9 17.3
Ecuador 9.8 22.4
El Salvador 7.9 7.2 10.7 13.2 24 3
Guatemala 8.1 4.4 7.7 4 105
Guyana 25.2 27 61 53
Honduras 4.5 20.8 12.7 46
Jamaica 10
Mexico 54.1 31 72.9 49 32
Nicaragua 23.4 48.2 38.3 2





Uruguay 19.9 11.6 20.2 21.6 4 12
Venezuela 25.9 14.9 32.6
Source: World Labor Report: Industrial Relations Democracy and Social Stability, 1997-1998 Statistical Annex.36
Table E.  Summary of Findings of Economic Performance and the Structure of Collective Bargaining, taken directly from OECD 1997 Employment Outlook.
Study Performance Measure Number of
Countries
Years Findings Support for U/
hump-shape
hypothesis
Grier (1997) Real GNP growth 24 1951-1988 Negative relationship with decentralized economies growing the fastest No
Bleaney (1996) Unemployment and inflation 17 1973-1989 Negative linear relationship between corporatism and unemployment; some evidence of a hump-shaped




Unemployment 20 1983-1994 Linear relationship No
Scarpetta (1996) Unemployment 15 to 17 1970-1993 Negative relationship between unemployment and coordination. Some evidence of U-shaped relationship




Unemployment, employment, Okun index
and API*
16 1974-1985 Negative relationship between coordination and unemployment;.U-shaped relationship between
coordination and employment; mixed results for the Okun index and API
Mixed
Bean (1994) Unemployment 20 1956-1992 Linear relationship with coordination No
Dowrick (1993) Productivity growth 18 1960s-1980s U-shaped conclusion that intermediate economies grow more slowly Yes
Golden (1993) Unemployment, employment, Okun index
and API*
17 1974-1984 Mixed results Mixed
Jackman (1993) Unemployment 20 1983-1988 Linear relationship No
Rowthorn (1992b) Employment and unemployment 17 1973-1985 U-shaped and hump-shaped relationships, respectively, but only in the 1980s Yes
Soskice (1990) Unemployment and API* 11 1985-1989 Positive relationship between coordination and performance No
Freeman (1988) Employment, unemployment and wage
growth
19 1979-1984/1985 U-shaped relationship between dispersion of wages, as a proxy measure of  corporatism, and employment;
hump-shaped relationship with unemployment and wage growth
Yes
OECD (1988) Unemployment and inflation 17 1971-1986 Hump-shaped relationship for unemployment Yes
Heitger (1987) Productivity growth 18 1960s-1970s U-shaped view that intermediate economies grow more slowly Yes
McCallum (1986) Okun index*  and real wage rigidity 18 1974-1984 Linear relationship between corporatism and performance No
* The Okun index is the sum of the unemployment and inflation rates; the Alternative Performance Index (API) is the sum of the unemployment rate and the current account deficit as a percentage of GDP.
See next page for full citation of studies.37
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Argentina x x x x
Bahamas x
Barbados x x x
Belize x x
Bolivia x x
Brazil x x x x
Colomiba x x
Costa Rica x x x x




Ecuador x x x
El Salvador x
Guatemala x x x x




Mexico x x x
Nicaragua x x x x
Panama x x
Paraguay x x
Peru x x x




Uruguay x x x x x
Venezuela x x x
Source: ILO World Labor Report 1997-1998, Table 5, pp. 255-256.39
Table F, cont.  Summary of ILO Conventions
Convention No. Norm
No. 87 (1948) Union Freedom and Protection of Freedom of Association: promotes the right of workers and
employers, without exception, to organize to promote and defend their interests.
No. 98 (1949) The Right to Unionize and of Collective Bargaining: promotes the protection of workers who
exercise their right to organize, the protection of workers= organizations from interference from
employers or employers= organizations (and visa versa), and the promotion of voluntary
collective bargaining with a view to  regulating employment conditions.
No. 135 (1971) Workers= Representatives: promotes the protection of workers= representatives in the firm
and instruments to realize this protection.
No. 141 (1975) Organization of Rural Workers: promotes union freedom of rural workers and incentives for
their organization and participation in social and economic development.
No. 151 (1978) Work Relations in the Public Sector: promotes the protection of public employees who 
exercise their right to union activity, to negotiate or participate in the determination of their
employment conditions, and conflict resolution without the interference of the public
authorities.
No. 154 (1981) Collective Bargaining: promotes free and voluntary collective bargaining.
Source: ILO   41
Table G
Country Recent Examples of Social Consultation
Argentina
1994 Framework Agreement for Employment, Productivity and Social Equity, entered into by the government, the Confederación General  de
Trabajo, the Argentine industrial union and employers= organizations.  It was an effort by the government to build consensus for  legislative reforms
affecting the workings of the labor market, i.e. employment contracts, conflict resolution, safety and health, training, occupational risks, collective
bargaining.
Brazil
Social consultation hasn=t played a great role in Brazil due to  history of authoritarian rule.  Successive attempts in  mid-80s with transition to
democracy failed.  The incompatibility of workers= demands and the government=s stabilization and economic programs frustrated efforts.
Chile
New stage of consultation in the 1990's.  1990 tri-partite agreement AChile: An Historic Opportunity@ signed by government, Unitarian Workers
Central and Confederation of Production and Commerce, recognizing importance of social dialogue, identifying important policy measures, reflected
change in position by unions re private firm and competitive markets as factors for growth, and aided in democratic transition. Success of the
consultation resulted in additional agreements and was instrumental in the swift reform of the labor laws.
Mexico
1987 Economic Solidarity Pact, 1988 Stability and Economic Growth Pact, 1992 National Agreement for the Raising of Productivity and Quality
(ANEPyC) instrumental in controlling inflation and the restructuring of the economy.  However, greatly reduced real wages.  Pacts criticized as not
originating in a consultative process but resulting from a state decision enabled by the cooptation of the large labor movements, principally the
Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos which virtually signed away salary increases of its members.  More recent agreements instrumental in
facing Mexico=s 1994/95 economic crisis.  1995 Unity Agreement on Overcoming the Economic Emergency,  subsequent action plan, and 1995
Alliance for Economic Recovery tightly restrained wage increases.  1996 New Labor Culture Agreement set series of guidelines to increase salaries
in line with increases in productivity.
Peru
Social consultation not successful in Peru, despite several efforts in the 1980s, culminating with establishment the of  Consejo Nacional de
Concertación by the Fujimori government.  Reasons given for the failure of social consultation is the heterogeneity and disunity in the country, the
weakness of labor movement, and a lack of attention to consensus by current government. Although the confederations or workers= centrals in Peru
historically have been unable to consolidate power,  recently they have made efforts and in 1991 formed a committee to coordinate activities.
Uruguay
Social consultation played important role in the transition to democracy. The 1985 Concertación Nacional Programática, a consultative process
between the four main political parties, the trade unions, employers= organizations, and student and human rights organizations was a unique
process because it was programmatic, not designed to be immediately applied but intended to achieve basic agreements to guide the next
government=s political, social and economic agenda -- none of the parties to the consultation were part of the existing government -- and
representation in the process was wide-spread. Social  consultation has not continued to play an important role, largely due to the labor movement=s
strong opposition to the government=s economic policies.  Wage councils (Consejos de Salarios) were reconvened with some modification in 1985
and served as artifacts of tri-partite cooperation.   State used its presence to control wage increases in collective agreements.  In 1990, this form of
intervention was prohibited and Consejos became purely voluntary.
Source: author=s analysis